This article analyses the nexus of technocracy-peacebuilding and its implications on water conflicts and hydropolitics. It is a conceptual exploration which advances an interdisciplinary approach by combining theories from two distinct research fields: peacebuilding and transboundary water management. It probes the argument that synergies between water management, development and peacebuilding frequently lead to technocratic and functional solutions. As empirical case illustration, the transboundary project, the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance (RSDSWC) is analysed regarding its peacebuilding and peace promoting potential. Three concluding remarks are drawn from the conceptual and empirical analysis. First, strong emphasis on technocratic solutions is inclined to favour supply-oriented options rather than solutions based on ethics of sustainable development and rights-based distribution. Second, functional solutions to water conflicts downplay at times complex hydro-political and asymmetrical relations between adversaries. Third, wider trends of privatization in the water sector coincide with similar developments in the field of peacebuilding, where new transnational actors are gaining influence as "new peacemakers", which are likely to have long-term consequences on power relations and the resolution of water conflict.
Introduction
This article addresses the politics of water and the interplay between technocracy and peacebuilding. While water quantity is highly securitized in basins such as the Nile and the Jordan rivers, the strategies to resolve water conflicts are frequently framed in depoliticized and technocratic ways. The Middle East is conflict-ridden region, mostly lacking cooperation between the neighbouring countries, while suffering from demandsupply imbalance in the water sector and suboptimal water management (Allan 2002) . Although most forecasts predicting water wars have proven exaggerated, the conflict scenario is still highly present in the framing of both scholars and policy-makers (see, for example, Kliot 1994 , Soffer 1994 , ICA 2012 , UNESCO 2012 , p. 215, Chellaney 2013 .
1 Such framing provides an overarching rationale for launching a large number of infrastructural water projects as a way of preventing conflict escalation. This is precisely the nexus between water management and peacebuilding that this article aims to address.
Many water projects are financed or co-financed by bilateral and multilateral foreign aid and channelled through international organizations, such as the World Bank. Large multinational companies (MNC) are also involved as consultants and operators.
2 Most of these projects focus on technical solutions of water management and supply, whereas more politically loaded questions about water rights, equity and redistribution tend to be avoided. As a consequence, technical framing of water management and development takes precedence, which for instance, can be observed in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), where massive international donor assistance has mostly been centred on improving water infrastructure for the Palestinians (Aggestam and Sundell 2014) .
The overarching aim of this article is to conceptually and empirically explore the interplay between water scarcity, technocracy and peacebuilding practices by CONTACT Karin Aggestam karin.aggestam@svet.lu.se 1 For water conflict narratives, see Trottier (2003) . 2 See World Bank support for adaptation to water scarcity in the MENA region through pipeline and infrastructure projects and technical assistance programmes (http://go.worldbank.org/87GRZ8H4B0). The US government is one of the largest bilateral donors and since 2000 has allocated nearly US$700 million for water sector assistance in Jordan (US embassy Jordan, press release, 18 March 2014).
the advancement of an interdisciplinary approach that combines the literature on transboundary water management with peacebuilding theory. It strives to make a conceptual contribution by merging these two strands of research, which are rarely combined despite the common and popular framing of peace, water and conflict by scholars and practitioners. The article raises three core questions: (1) How can the interplay between technocracy and peacebuilding be conceptualized and understood in theory as well as within the context of water management;? (2) In what ways are water conflicts addressed within a functionalist paradigm?; and (3) What are the implications of technocratic water management and peacebuilding for the resolution of water conflict? The argument advanced is that water scarcity is frequently framed with a dual emphasis on conflictual and cooperative dimensions. It is therefore an important and prioritized area of peacebuilding intervention. Yet, synergies between water management, development and peacebuilding favour technocratic and functional solutions, which therefore are inclined to circumvent hydropolitics. The article strives to make a critical assessment of technocracy in relation to water and peacebuilding. However, it does not disregard the huge importance and impact that technical innovations and engineering solutions have for water development and systems. For instance, the technique and use of desalination has in many ways changed perceptions of what constitutes water scarcity and presents new opportunities of sharing water. Nevertheless, what the article aims to do is to critically probe the effects of technocracy in water development and peacebuilding in relation to politics, power and participation. The conceptual discussion will be illustrated by the empirical case of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project (RSDSWC). This is undoubtedly one of the most high-profile transboundary water projects in the region and can be seen as a critical case since it makes the ambitious claim to promote a peace dividend, that is, the project is assumed to trigger wider long-term social and economic benefits in the region. The RSDSWC also has strong links to the MEPP, since it grew out of plans about integrated water management between Israel and Jordan after the signing of a peace agreement in 1994. Most importantly, one of its three objectives is to become "a symbol of peace and cooperation in the Middle East" (World Bank 2013, p. 2). The multi-billion dollar project moved one step further towards realization after the release of a feasibility study which was commissioned by the World Bank (Coyne and Bellier 2009 ), yet funding remains a critical issue.
3 For the empirical analysis, we have used a variety of sources and material, such as data and reports produced by Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian official sources, leading international institutions, organizations and NGOs, as well as making use of a broad range of secondary sources.
The article begins with a discussion of how politics and technology are intertwined in the water sector. It shows how technology, innovation and science have merged and transformed into a new paradigm on water management where transnational actors, such as water experts, donors, multinational companies and international institutions have become major players. These actors also interact within the wider setting of peacebuilding and technical assistance. The second part analyses the case of the RSDSWC project and discusses the extensive critique levelled against the project. Beyond strong environmental concerns, it is striking how absent hydropolitical considerations are in the project, while the project still claims to bring a peace dividend. The strong emphasis on technocracy reflects and triggers a depoliticizing trend in the field of water management and peacebuilding, which has long-term effects on power relations and the resolution of conflict.
The nexus of water-technocracy-peace
Politics and technology are deeply intertwined in the water sector. Historically, water has been associated with power and nation building (Wittfogel 1957) . During the 19th and 20th centuries, water engineering was strongly linked with colonial projects and development schemes. New technological innovations made way for massive exploitation of lakes, rivers and aquifers. Investment in infrastructure for extracting hydropower multiplied in quantity (Mollinga et al. 2008 , Zwarteeven 2008 ) and dams of different sizes mushroomed (Conca 2005, pp. 80-82) . Also international organizations established during this period gathered around the same goal to control water flows primarily by constructing large dams and expanding irrigation practices (Conca 2005, pp. 83-85) . The projects of this era were products of the dominant discourse, which centred on a perceived "hydraulic mission". By establishing a "dependable flow" of water and irrigation, other techniques could be applied in order to expand agricultural activities and secure food production. Standardized technical solutions and centralized legislation were made a maxim to be implemented all over the globe (Allan 2002, p. 28) . In some cases, for example in Israel, the scarcity paradigm in the water sector occurred simultaneously against the background of developing a strong centralized state (Alatout 2008) .
The technical discourse was reinforced by a majority of civil engineers who came to dominate the water sector and authorities. Hence, water infrastructure was highly influential in policy-making at the national level in many countries (Zwarteveen 2008) . As Nina Laurie (2005, p. 540) states: "Wielding political power with techno-fix solutions to poverty and mega-project short cuts to a more modern society, it is no coincidence that leading politicians and in some cases presidents have been drawn from the ranks of civil engineers".
Technology, innovation and science have often been promoted as a way of avoiding the effects of water scarcity on economic and sustainable development. From a technocratic perspective, scarcity reflects bad management, poor science and technology rather than physical limitations. Such an approach also tends to downplay the political dimensions of technology. "In most cases, technology is made out to be an apolitical instrument-scientific committees and experts are sought as 'arbiters' of which scarce resources are managed and allocated. But in reality, technology and techniques are deeply political-and contestations around technological solutions [. . .] are sites of politics" (Mehta 2010, p. 26) .
During the most recent decades, water management practices have experienced a dramatic development. Technocratic and managerial science has become the ideal for a new group of technocrats and old development paradigms have accordingly been challenged and even marginalized (Laurie 2005) . Furthermore, the field has gradually become more international. New transnational actors have appeared in the water sector and others have been transformed. But in recent years, large donors, such as the World Bank and regional development banks, have become increasingly hesitant to sponsor disputed projects, for example, large dam constructions, because of selfimposed ethical guidelines and social and environmental impact analyses. Instead, private multinational companies, such as Bechtel, Vivendi and Ondeo, are advancing as partners and investors in large-scale infrastructure projects (Cosgrove 2003, p. 49) . Despite the controversies, large water infrastructure projects are proceeding around the world, notably the Three Gorges Dam in China, the GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project) in Turkey and the Great Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia. One of the most spectacular water project plans in the Middle East is the RSDSWC, which serves as an interesting empirical illustration of the importance of technocracy in the water sector and the framing of an infrastructural project as a symbol for peace.
In short, what is discerned in the field of water management is a strong depoliticizing trend. In line with other environmental concerns, water scarcity is presented as "a collective, natural problem" (Otero et al. 2009 (Otero et al. , p. 1299 . Such discursive construction diminishes the socio-political aspects of scarcity and undermines claims for reallocation and rights-based arguments. Moreover, depoliticization operates through de-contextualization and universalization. By referring to general scientific principles and environmental universalism, local socio-economic structures are downplayed in decision-making processes. Consequently, other sources of context-bound values that may reflect complex historical, cultural and social dimensions of water are frequently ignored (Ahlers and Zwarteeven 2009).
Hydropolitics and the resolution of water conflict
Hydropolitics is defined as "the systematic study of conflict and cooperation between states over water resources that transcend international borders" (Elhance 1999, p. 3) . The academic debates have largely centred either on realist stipulations, which argue that water scarcity is related to risks of conflict escalation, or on functionalist assumptions, which promote the normative idea that scarcity encourages parties to cooperate over shared waters. Realists underline the zero-sum game between competing states, which is further complicated by an upstream-downstream problem (Lowi 1993) . From a supply perspective, this kind of animosity and suspicion between riparian states is therefore likely to end in suboptimal outcomes. However, these pessimistic analyses have been countered and questioned by functionalist arguments and studies which conclude, on a more positive note, that scarcity fosters cooperation and therefore has great potential to trigger win-win outcomes (Deudney 1991 , Wolf 1994 , Dolaytar and Gray 2000 , Alam 2002 ). The Nile, the Senegal River and the Zambesi are river basins where cooperation and negotiations have been more common than conflict. Even in cases with hostile riparian states, such as in the case of India and Pakistan, or Syria and Iraq, there has been strategic cooperation (Dolaytar and Gray 2000, p. 19) . Also data sharing and joint management of the Yarmuk and Jordan rivers by Israel and Jordan, as well as technical cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis, are mentioned as examples of collaboration that already exists between the riparians (Amery and Wolf 2000, p.1) .
Functionalist theory stresses the possibility to nurture and develop cooperation between adversaries in areas of "low politics", which is considered less fraught than controversial "high politics" issues. Ideally, functional and technocratic cooperation will build trust between parties and then trigger positive spill-over effects into other fields of high politics, such as security, defence and foreign policy. More specifically, it means framing joint activities in the water sector in a technical and apolitical way. International institutions and organizations are seen as critical players where shared scientific knowledge, expertise and technology assist in constructing shared frames, interests and needs. Ultimately, functional cooperation may transform deep mistrust between adversaries and make a sustainable peace more likely (Dolaytar and Gray 2000 , Haas 2008 , Jägerskog 2009 ).
Such an incremental and apolitical approach constitutes the ideational foundation of a large number of transboundary projects involving shared water infrastructure in the Jordan River basin. A shared desalination plant to supply Aqaba in Jordan and Eilat in Israel with freshwater has been suggested along with largerscale water transfers, such as a peace pipeline from Turkey to Israel, via Syria, and the transfer of Nile water to Israel and Palestine (Beaumont 2000 , p. 42, Ben-Shahar et al. 1989 . One of the most advanced projects of this magnitude is the RSDSWC, which is analysed below (Section 3).
However, sceptics, such as Selby (2003, p. 342) , argue that the importance of water in a region such as the Middle East may be overrated as a contributing factor regarding conflict as well as cooperation. While droughts and insufficient water resources certainly cause grievances at local levels, especially in poor and marginalized communities, the effects on aggregate level policies are limited. With decreasing dependency on domestic agriculture and increasing imports of food stock and other water-intensive staples in the region, the most water-dependent segment of national economies is declining in many states of the MENA region. Such arguments undermine the ability of water to act as a broker for Arab-Israeli peace. Selby (2003, p. 342) therefore concludes that water cooperation "has tended to follow rather than lead peace making." Other scholars also underline that such functional cooperation can border on coercion in cases of strong power asymmetry between parties (Selby 2003 , Zeitoun 2008 . Jägerskog (2009) highlights the importance of power relations in water treaties and stresses the role and impact of hegemonic states for specific cooperative outcomes. Unequal treaty structures can therefore make the participation of the weaker party more symbolical than operational.
Technocratic turn in peacebuilding
Since the early 1990s, dominant policy discourses have continuously made the claim that there is a linkage between water scarcity and conflict, while at the same time arguing for the potential of sharing water through peaceful cooperation. Most of the cooperative ideas have centred on creating new water and more efficient usage of water rather than addressing more complex socio-political dynamics of redistribution. To encourage investment and donor assistance in water development and infrastructure, such as dams, pipelines, desalination plants, waste water treatment plants and drip irrigation systems, these policy discourses frequently warn of potential risks for conflict escalation if such preventive actions are not taken (Katz 2011, pp. 19-28) . Such technological framing of water conflicts corresponds with the technical turn in peacebuilding (Stetter et al. 2010 , p. 448, MacGinty 2012 , Aggestam 2015 .
In recent years, a new broad range of international peace experts who favour science, bureaucracy and administration have gained prominence. There are also numerous toolboxes, handbooks and best practices that are prescribed and promoted in various regions. 4 This kind of technical assistance has been provided by a rapidly expanding peacebuilding sector consisting of a broad range of state actors, international institutions and NGOs who strive to transform conflict-ridden regions into sustainable zones of peace (MacGinty 2012, p. 294) . 5 Peacebuilding, in such contexts, is often used interchangeably in practice with technical assistance and frequently structured according to project management logic with well-defined funding schemes that are limited in time. As such, it reflects the power of expert knowledge and the importance of a shared language to frame and prescribe what is considered to be the most efficient peacebuilding strategies.
Such development has simultaneously taken place in a transformative post-political environment where states to an ever-larger extent have begun to privatise and outsource many of the tasks of peacebuilding to private actors and NGOs (Carey 2012) . Some analysts describe this phenomenon as a "peace industry" with a vested interest, which is guided by a prescriptive and generic understanding of how, technically speaking, peace may be built (MacGinty 2012, p. 289) . It is also firmly embedded within existing norms and practices of the global north and western institutions. However, the consequence of nurturing such technological approaches to peace may unintentionally generate a depoliticized peace which is likely to ignore the underlying contestation of power and structural inequalities in a conflict. Furthermore, since politics tends to be viewed as "messy" and hindering effective peacebuilding, such technocratic strategies are favoured at the expense of more participatory approaches (MacGinty 2012, p. 292).
As a way to make the processes of water management more "rational" the politics is often seen as an obstacle that needs to be removed out of the water equation. According to Warner and Wegerich (2010, p. 11) "[p] olitics . . . is a Bad Thing, and it is often seen as a problem. If politics is a problem, it can be 'solved' by depoliticising issues, giving them back to the experts." Yet, to depoliticize water conflict and to frame it in a techno-managerial way can have, as mentioned before, unforeseen consequences regarding ownerships, power dynamics and contextual sensitivity. Such framing may blur significant dispositional power of influential groups and actors, such as water managers and experts. Despite their heavy impact, the power of these groups is seldom assessed because their expertise is viewed as objective, unbiased and apolitical. Furthermore, their positions frequently generate powerful claims of representing the correct solution of a given problem (Warner and Wegerich 2010, p. 6) . This is reflected in many water development projects, where the tendency is to privilege technical solutions, description and prescription that are non-area specific. Lacking substantial knowledge of local contexts, these water experts are inclined to present their ideas as impartial (Selby 2003 , p. 44, Katz 2011 . Furthermore, international peacebuilding actors together with water experts frequently play a double-edged role in the way they are mediating and financing water development projects. According to Julie Trottier, the "development brokers" (2006) constitute a new class of actors that have emerged in this context. These brokers interact between the local and international actors. They are defined as local agencies who have extensive insights into the international donor community, while their local networks allow them to act as intermediaries between the targeted communities and the donors themselves. Their role is oftentimes crucial as they are managing meanings of water and speaking the "right" technical language. To note, there is often fierce competition among several local agencies for funds where some local actors who are dependent on international donor assistance are empowered and others disempowered (Trottier 2006) .
In summary, despite the effort to depoliticize water management, it is still a highly volatile process with contested meanings of water and with a multitude of actors who possess unequal power to compete, negotiate and cooperate. This is the main rationale for needing to engage with the depoliticized discursive constructions of water (Warner and Wegerich 2010, p. 49) . In the next section, we analyse how the ideas of technocratic and functional peacebuilding play out in the hydropolitical contexts and in the case of the RSDSWC project.
Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance
The Dead Sea is known for being the lowest spot on Earth and for the high salinity of its seawater. However, the unique ecosystem and landscape is under threat of serious degradation. Towards the end of the last century, water levels successively began to decrease, from-397 m in 1968 to-423 m in 2012. During the same period, the sea lost a third of its surface area and the levels of salinity increased further (World Bank 2013). The reason for this dramatic development is the extensive diversion of water from the tributaries to the Dead Sea by the countries of the region, particularly by Israel, Jordan and Syria. The largest contributor, the Jordan River, has experienced a rapid decline in overall flow and is now completely dry in summertime. 6 In addition, a large number of wells have also been drilled in the area, which contributes to the diminished inflow. Most of the diverted water is used in the agricultural sector, but due to economic and demographic changes there has also been an increase in domestic and industrial demand (World Bank 2013). Furthermore, the Dead Sea water is used by large chemical industries in Israel and Jordan (the Dead Sea Works and Arab Potash Company). Dead Sea water is stored in mineral evaporation ponds and this causes about 26% of total outflow from the sea (World Bank 2013). The proposal to connect the Dead Sea with the Red Sea or the Mediterranean is not new, but was specified further after the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty when a plan for integrated development was designed (El-Anis and Smith 2013). Later on the Palestinian Authority joined as a third partner and, on 9 May 2005, representatives of the three governments signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study. Together they produced a proposal for the World Bank to finance the project in order to achieve three declared objectives (World Bank 2013):
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(1) to save the Dead Sea from environmental degradation; (2) to generate hydroelectricity and desalinated water at affordable prices to the citizens of Jordan, Israel and the PA; and (3) to build a symbol of peace and cooperation in the Middle East (Fig. 1) .
According to the project plan, the intake pipe from the Red Sea and a pumping station was to be located in Aqaba, Jordan. Sea water, up to 2000 hm 3 annually, would be pumped from there up to the highest point of the conveyance through a pressure pipeline and continue 180 km north in pipelines and canals through Wadi Araba, entirely on Jordanian territory, until reaching the Dead Sea as a final destination. A desalination plant and a hydro-electricity plant were planned along the way, and desalinated water was to be piped to designate areas in Jordan, Israel and on the West Bank while other carriers would dispose of brine (World Bank 2013). In December 2013 representatives of the Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian governments signed an initial agreement to connect the Red Sea and the Dead Sea with a pipeline, although on a far more modest scale than the original plan. According to the agreement only 100 hm 3 annually will be transferred from the Red Sea, which would not save but merely "slow the drying up of the Dead Sea" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013). A desalination plant in Aqaba will produce potable water for the populations in southern Jordan and Israel, while Israel agrees to sell water to Jordan from Lake Kinneret in the north. The costs of the project are estimated at US$300-400 million (compared to US$7.5 billion for the original project 8 ) and will be financed through a BOT-model (Coyne and Bellier 2009, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013) .
Recent proceedings of the RSDSWC follow the release of a feasibility study of the project financed by the World Bank through donations from, among others, USA, France and Sweden 9 (El-Anis and Smith 2013). In 2008 the consulting company Coyne and Bellier was contracted to carry out the study and in 2012 the findings were presented in a Draft Feasibility Study, including an Environmental and Social Assessment, modelling schemes for the Red Sea and the Dead Sea and a study of alternatives (Allan et al. 2012) . The latter study was not requested by the governments, but compiled after pressure from civil society (Friends of the Earth Middle East, FoEME 2013). The study of alternatives (Allan et al. 2012) widens the perspective by comparing more than 20 alternatives with the RSDSWC, including a number of combinations of actions: the restoration of the Lower Jordan River using recycled water; water transfer from the Mediterranean or from Turkey; or desalination of Mediterranean or Red Sea water. 10 The authors point out that a combination of alternatives 11 has environmental advantages compared with the baseline case while still addressing all three objectives of the project. Environmental and socio-political concerns among stakeholders are discernible in reports from hearings and 7 Although the project is multilateral it is arguably the Jordanian government, with few other supply-side options to meet increasing water demands, that has promoted the project most whole-heartedly. This may be due to the bleak prospects of renegotiating present water allocations in the river basin (Zeitoun et al. 2010) . The fact that Israel is planning the world's largest desalination plant on the Mediterranean coast has presumably led to a declined interest in the more controversial and less profitable conveyance (Lipchin 2007) . Moreover, an entirely Jordanian conveyance option, without Israeli or Palestinian involvement, has also figured among the options (Allan et al. 2012, p. 66) . In August 2013, the Jordanian Prime Minister announced that Jordan was to proceed unilaterally with a first phase of the project at a cost of approximately US$980 million (Jordan to proceed with the first phase in 2013). 8 This includes the costs for the conveyance, a desalination plant and a hydropower facility (Coyne and Bellier 2009) . 9 The cost of the feasibility study amounted to about US$16 million (World Bank 2013). 10 The alternatives of the study have all circulated in the region as options targeting the same issues as the RSDSWC. In the study, they are subjected to a standardized comparison to a varying extent regarding pros and cons in addition to their technical, economic, environmental and social feasibility (Allan et al. 2012, p. x) . 11 The authors highlight, in particular, alternative CA1, that is, desalination of water in Aqaba and the Mediterranean, water importation from Turkey and water recycling and conservation (Allan et al. 2012) .
meetings presented in the environmental and social assessment. However, most of the respondents gave positive views of the RSDSWC and in all countries mostly technical questions were posed. Yet, the Palestinians were reported to be concerned about "the lack of Palestinian access to the Dead Sea, and of Palestinian water rights and control of water resources and of the implications of this study and the project on those" (ERM 2008). On the Israeli side, the greatest concern was the lack of a study of alternatives (subsequently included in the pre-study), but also questions concerning governance and control of the project as well as about the quality of cooperation between the parties. In the Jordanian case, questions of freshwater allocation and distribution were seen as important, but also the effect of the construction on land and employment issues (ERM 2008 (ERM , 2010 .
Towards a transformative peace?
Hardly surprisingly, the idea of such mega-project as the RSDSWC has triggered heated debates and critique. Some of the critical voices, such as FoEME, find the alarming argument reflected in the project that the Dead Sea is likely to dry up exaggerated and point out that such an assumption contradicts most assessments made in the scientific community (Asmar 2003 , FoEME 2007 . 12 The overall objections of the project concern the environmental impact, the stakeholder process, the study of other alternatives to address the shrinking of the Dead Sea, and the wider political contexts.
First, environmental concerns include the microbiological effects of mixing water from the Red Sea with the Dead Sea, as the former is rich with sulphates whereas the latter is rich in calcium. Objections have also been raised regarding the effects of installing an intake water pipe in the fragile marine environment of Aqaba Bay, which may threaten the delicate coral reefs. 13 The canal will also cross the Araba valley with the potential risks of affecting the groundwater in this area by increased salinity in the case of seawater leakages. To note, this is a very seismic area. In addition there are growing numbers of large sinkholes around the Dead Sea, causing dangers for visitors and nearby infrastructure. These are likely to grow if underlying soil is taken away as part of the construction (Gavrieli et al. 2005 , Qdais 2008 , Arwa and Awabhe 2010 , FoEME 2010 .
Second, the planning and stakeholder process of the study programme has been questioned because it is not viewed as comprehensive and independent enough along the principles of sustainable development. One of the most vocal and public critics of the study project is FoEME (2008, 2010, 2011) , which states that the tender process was far too short, lacked transparency and included a diverse set of consultants closely connected to the beneficiary governments. Furthermore, these consultants have produced reports of poor quality according to FoEME. Abitol (2009) shares this critical assessment and argues that the consultation process ought to include principles of social sustainability and dialogues, particularly with stakeholders of the least empowered groups, in order to build trust and confidence in the project. Yet, as mentioned above, the questionnaires that were conducted among the different concerned sectors still show an overall support for the RSDSWC as there are high expectations that the project will trigger economic development, work opportunities, investment, additional water and energy in the region (FoEME 2010).
Third, the study programme of the RSDSWC has been criticised because it has not seriously explored other less controversial and costly alternatives (FoEME 2008) . There are two new/old ideas that are often discussed in this context. First, an alternative route of transferring water to the Dead Sea from the Mediterranean Sea has been suggested. This proposal is seen as more cost-effective while causing less environmental damage and fewer risks posed to freshwater aquifers. Furthermore, it is considered to have a high potential to generate clean hydro-electric power while also producing a substantial amount of potable water with desalination techniques. However, as Israeli et al. (2010) state, "politics complicates the picture." The Palestinians and Jordanians will be heavily dependant on Israel controlling the Mediterranean coastline. With such a constellation, Israel would turn from lower to upper riparian regarding desalination of seawater. This is the main reason why Jordan rejects the proposal and favours the RSDSWC, as it would be on Jordanian territory and linked to the Red Sea (Feitelson and Rosenthal 2012, p. 280) .
Another alternative, promoted particularly by FoEME (2007), is the rehabilitation of the Lower Jordan River, which is mentioned in the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan from 1994. The basic rationale of this proposal is to make sufficient water available to flow into the Jordan River and here the agricultural sector is seen as one of the major obstructions, which needs restructuring. The agriculture sectors in Israel and Jordan consume approximately 60-70% of the total water utilization while only contributing to 2-3% of the GNP in each country (FoEME 2008) .
Most important for the purpose of this article is the critique forwarded about the stipulated claim that the project would generate a peace dividend. It builds on an underlying functional and linear assumption about peace that was discussed in the previous section. Resolving water scarcity with technical development and cooperation is assumed to promote economic growth and development. With positive "spill-over" effects to other areas, a sustainable peace, based on mutual interdependence between the parties, may then ultimately prevail. Important players and drivers in such a peace endeavour are the private sector, technical water experts and the international donor community, which are assumed to be less constrained by factional or contentious politics (El-Anis and Smith 2013, pp. 16-18) . However, as Feitelson and Rosenthal (2012, p. 273) argue, introducing new techniques, such as desalination, changes power constellations and relations. Desalination tends to be framed as a universal panacea to water scarcity, but changes focus away from redistribution of shared water resources to the creation of new additional water supplies. Furthermore, desalination is introduced as part of wider commercialization and privatization of the water sector, which has depoliticizing effects due to the strong emphasis on technocracy and economics.
14 Such an outcome, they argue, fits well with the global dominance of neoliberalism and with the new economic-technocratic class emerging (Feitelson and Rosenthal 2012, p. 282) .
Despite the overarching ambition of the RSDSWC project to strive for peace and cooperation, it is still the technical considerations that have consumed most of the allocated resources. The issue of cooperation is rarely discussed in the study and the sub-studies. It is basically assumed that cooperation may be encouraged by "complementary planning, management and investment actions" in the combined alternative option CA1 (Allan et al. 2012, p. xxxii) . Hence, there is no in-depth assessment of how the project might contribute to peace. Instead, the assumption seems to be that a collaborative project will automatically become a symbol of peace. Yet, as Abitol (2009, pp. 38-44) states, such "pure" technical collaboration between the parties can be questioned, since it avoids addressing the core conflicting issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even though the Palestinians have been formally included as one of the three beneficiaries with official recognition as a partner, highly controversial issues such as access to the Dead Sea, land control and water rights are still circumvented with arguments that these questions are part of the final status negotiations. 15 Consequently, in practice, the Palestinians are without influence and their role has been marginalized. This is the reason why Abitol (2009, p. 44) concludes that the project is projecting a "chimeric peace dividend," which will sustain rather than resolve the conflict. For the sake of building a sustainable peace, it is not enough to be technical and functional, but needs to include political and transformative dynamics as well (see also FoEME 2007).
It may be argued that the feasibility study did not strive towards such comprehensive assessment. Yet, as the project frames and stipulates, as one of its three core objectives, to build peace and cooperation, a more thorough inquiry of the political prerequisites may constructively balance the technical assessment. The remark that the project, hydropolitics aside, might anyway prove to be successful in combatting water-related problems in the region disregards the longstanding effects the multi-million dollar project may have on the power relations between the collaborating parties and also on future investments in the water sector.
Conclusion
The Middle East is a region suffering not only from water scarcity, but also from highly volatile politics and widespread violent conflicts. It is therefore not surprising that so much attention has been given to debating the risks of potential future water wars, as well as advancing various proposals of promoting peace. In this article, we have addressed this problem by unpacking and analysing the interplay between the politics of water, technocracy and peacebuilding. While the framing of water has been securitized as high politics in most of the countries in the region, the prospect of resolving water scarcity and achieving peace has mostly been dominated by technical, managerial and functional solutions.
From the conceptual analysis and empirical illustration of the RSDSWC project, three concluding remarks are made. First, the case illustrates how technological solutions are likely to favour supply-oriented options by producing "new" water in the form of piped and desalinated Red Sea water, rather than solutions that favour rights-based redistribution and allocation. Second, the feasibility study, which is financed by the World Bank, avoided in-depth elaboration on wider complex hydropolitical relations that persist between Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians. Despite the overarching ambition of establishing peaceful cooperation, it is not discussed more precisely what the necessary pre-conditions may be and in what ways such an outcome can be accomplished. This vagueness is contrasted to the more precise technical considerations that are prioritized and given most of the allocated resources. It might be argued that an analysis of the potential political outcomes of the RSDSWC is outside the scope of a feasibility study. Yet, as the main scientific assessment, the study both directly and indirectly lends legitimacy to the project objectives, which include a peace dividend. Without addressing contested political issues, such as Palestinian water control and access to the Dead Sea, a sustainable peace seems unlikely. Third, technocratic and depoliticized water management is deepened and widened by the transformation and privatization of the water sector. With the rise in new transnational actors and large multinational companies, which are guided less by policies of social and environmental corporate responsibilities, there are reasons to be concerned about the effects on the environment and disempowered local populations.
